Madam President, I support

S.J. Res. 45 authorizing the use of

force against Iraq.

Perhaps the most difficult decision

one can make as a Member of this body

is to vote to send American troops into

harm’s way. It forces one to consider

every question, every possibility, and

every option short of war. But this does

not mean we should eschew action simply

because we have not yet tried every

other option. Some threats must be

dealt with before implausible alternatives

are allowed to play out because

of the consequences of delay. Preemption

may be the only logical course of

action in some situations. A nation

need not allow itself to be struck to be

justified in acting to protect itself.

With these principles in mind, we can

evaluate the need to authorize the use

of force against Iraq. Actually, use of

force against Iraq has already been authorized

by both the United States and

the United Nations. And the United

States and Great Britain are already

using force on a weekly basis.

Notwithstanding his obligations to

allow aerial inspections in the no-fly

zones, Saddam Hussein regularly attempts

to shoot down our unarmed reconnaissance

planes, and we either

react by destroying the offending antiaircraft

site or seek to discover and destroy

it before it can fire—preemption.

No one questions our right to do this.

Two facts can, therefore, be established:

No. 1, Saddam Hussein is not

willing to allow unconditional inspections

as he claims. He is not doing it

now. No. 2, his continued violation of

the United Nations resolutions requires

a military response. That is assuming

the resolutions were intended to be enforced

when they were adopted. Delay

in doing so only degrades our claim of

authority to act and makes more difficult

the task.

No one can argue that the United

States and the international community

have not exhausted the full range

of legal, diplomatic, and other alternatives

to try to compel Saddam Hussein

to obey all of the terms of the

cease-fire to which he agreed at the end

of the gulf war. His continuing defiance

of that agreement, including his desire

to acquire nuclear weapons and his

support of terrorism, presents a real

and growing threat to U.S. national security.

We have now reached a juncture

where the risks of inaction outweigh

the risks of action.

Those who oppose the authorization

of force usually define the test as

whether there is an immediate threat,

asking, Why do we have to act now?

But I submit this is the wrong question.

Our intelligence will never be

good enough to allow us to calibrate

our action to a threat just a few days

or a few weeks away. We simply do not

know enough to do that. We cannot

wait until we are sure that Iraq has a

nuclear weapon and is about to use it

because it is unlikely we will ever have

that evidence, and it will be too late

when we do.

I find it ironic that some of the people

insisting on this standard are also

some of the loudest critics of our intelligence

failures before September 11,

arguing that we should have known an

attack was imminent and we should

have taken action to prevent it. If September

11 had not happened, my guess

is that these same people would be urging

caution, arguing that since we

haven’t yet ‘‘connected all the dots,’’

any preemptive action at that time

would be too risky and premature.

Moreover, action is warranted now

because there is no realistic hope that

the United Nations resolutions and

Saddam’s promises to us at the end of

the gulf war will otherwise be enforced,

and each month that passes increases

the danger.

Finally, Iraq is another front in this

war on terror. Eliminating Saddam’s

threat will give us greater latitude in

other actions we will have to take, and

it will create a more willing group of

allies in the region. For some of these

countries to throw in with us, they

need to know that we are absolutely

committed to winning and that they

are better off joining the winning side

than continuing to pay tribute to terrorists

in order to protect their regimes

from terrorists.

While there is much about Iraq’s capabilities

we do not know, there are

also some things we do know. No one,

for example, can doubt the extent of

Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

The only question is when and how he

will use them and how long it will be

before he can add nuclear weapons to

his existing chemical and biological capabilities.

In recounting Iraq’s nasty capabilities,

it is useful to remind ourselves

that Baghdad has continued to pursue

the development of these weapons of

mass destruction and the means to deliver

them in violation of numerous

U.N. resolutions. There are 13 such resolutions.

During the 7 years that the United

Nations Special Commission—

UNSCOM—inspectors were present in

Iraq, Saddam Hussein went to great

lengths to obstruct inspections to conceal

his stockpiles and continue his

programs under cloak of secrecy. It has

now been 4 years since United Nations

inspection teams last set foot in Iraq.

We have evidence that Saddam has

used that time to enhance his weapons

and his development programs. I need

not detail that evidence here. It has

been amply discussed in a variety of

open and closed sources of information

provided by the administration, and it

includes everything banned by the

United Nations—chemical, biological,

and nuclear weapons, and the means of

delivering them.

In addition, Saddam Hussein has

demonstrated proclivity to use force to

achieve his objectives—twice against

his neighbors. And his aggressive ambitions

have already led him to deploy

the devastating weapons if his stockpiles.

He used chemical weapons

against Iran. He again used them

against his own Kurdish population.

And he has launched ballistic missiles

against four neighbors. He is devoting

enormous resources of his country to

upgrade his threat, which is not an action

of one who only wants to survive.

There should be little doubt that

Saddam Hussein will use his weapons

of mass destruction again either to

back up a threat to harm us if we stand

in the way of some future aggression or

in actual attack against us or our allies,

including, potentially a terrorist

type attack on our homeland. A recent

article by Kenneth Pollack in the Arizona

Republic amplifies this point. In

the article,

Saddam Hussein’s abuse of the Iraqi

people is also deplorable, not to mention

a violation of a U.N. resolution

passed just after the Gulf War, resolution

688. His hideous treatment of Iraqi

men, women, and children is documented.

A report published by Human

Rights Watch in 1990 described the

shocking brutality of the Iraqi regime:

And, as Iraqi citizens starve, Saddam

has illegally used oil revenues from the

U.N. oil-for-food program to rebuild his

military capabilities, including his

weapons of mass destruction. Then, of

course, Saddam blames the United

States and the United Nations for the

suffering of the Iraqi people.

Finally, there is Saddam Hussein’s

support for international terrorism. In

his address to the Nation following the

September 11 attacks, President Bush

presented the countries of the world

with two unambiguous options.

Saddam Hussein made his decision.

Iraq was the only Arab-Muslim country

that failed to condemn the September

11 attack. In fact, the official

Iraqi media stated on that day that

America was ‘‘reaping the fruits of [its]

crimes against humanity.’’ We know

that Iraq has hosted members of al-

Qaeda. And National Security Advisor

Condoleezza Rice has commented specifically

on Iraq-al-Qaeda ties.

And Iraq has supported other terrorists.

For example, Abu Abbas, the mastermind

of the 1985 *Achille Lauro* hijacking

and murderer of American

Leon Klinghoffer, lives in Baghdad.

The notorious Abu Nidal lived in Baghdad

from 1974 to 1983, and then again

recently until he was gunned down earlier

this year. And Saddam Hussein has

provided over $10 million to the families

of Palestinian homicide bombers.

Now, the question is, what has the

international community been doing

about all of this? The answer, Madam

President, is not much. The much-touted

doctrine of deterrence only works if

agreements are enforced. Saddam obviously

has not been deterred because no

one has been willing to stop him from

continuing his unlawful activities.

Saddam Hussein has failed to live up

to his cease-fire obligations. The U.N.

has failed to enforce them. President

Bush described it succinctly in his

speech before the United Nations:

If nothing else, the decade following

the Gulf War has illustrated clearly the

limits of U.N. diplomacy. But the U.S.

does not have to participate in this

folly. Our word must mean something.

If we fail to force Saddam Hussein to

comply with his obligations, we will

have sowed the seeds of even greater

and more threatening action in the future.

Is it possible that we could avoid

military actions by accepting Iraq’s

offer to allow unlimited inspections?

The answer, I submit, is no. It would

have been hard enough for UNSCOM,

but it has been replaced by a new entity

negotiated between Secretary General

Kofi Annan and Iraq in 1998. Unlike

UNSCOM, this new entity, the

U.N. Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection

Commission, known as

UNMOVIC, is staffed by U.N. employees,

rather than officials on loan from

member governments.

The inspectors—who are not even required

to have expertise in relevant

weapon programs—will not be able to

make effective use of intelligence information.

They can’t receive intelligence

information on a privileged

basis, and the information that they

gather can’t flow back to national intelligence

agencies, like our CIA. As

Gary Millholin, Director of the Wisconsin

Project on Nuclear Arms control

recently commented, ‘‘This eliminates

the main incentive for intelligence

sources to provide UNMOVIC

with information in the first place.’’

Since most of what we learned during

inspections was the result of intelligence

gathered from Iraqi defectors,

it is doubtful UNMOVIC could produce

much of value.

The absurdity of this set-up can only

be trumped by the absurdity of believing

that this commission could possibly

succeed against a vicious dictator

who has spent the last 11 years perfecting

the arts of concealment and deception

in a country the size of France.

As David Kay, former head of the

U.N.’s nuclear inspection team, recently

remarked, ‘‘The only way you

will end the weapons of mass destruction

program in Iraq is by removing

Saddam from power.’’

Let me repeat that. This is from the

former head of the nuclear inspection

team of the United Nations:

Here is the bottom line on the international

community’s ability to deal

with the Iraqi threat: Since the end of

the Gulf War, Saddam has a nearly perfect

record in violating U.N. Security

Council resolutions. The United Nations,

in turn, has a nearly perfect

record in failing to enforce them.

It is time to end this whole charade.

Knowing that diplomacy will continue

to fail, we have an obligation to act,

and not allow diplomacy to be used as

a weapon by a brutal dictator. That is

a lesson we should have learned

through our experiences with the likes

of Hitler, Stalin, Ho Chi Minh, and

Slobodan Milosevic. Moreover, too

much is at stake to place American security

in the hands of unaccountable

bureaucrats at the U.N.

It is time for military action that

will terminate the regime of Saddam

Hussein and destroy his weapons of

mass destruction. We cannot be assured

of peace unless this threat is removed.

Some observers still insist that we

should try to contain Saddam through

the doctrine of deterrence. After all,

they say, we relied on deterrence to

contain the Soviets for 50 years, and

maybe that will work against Saddam.

Mr. President, perhaps we should be

thankful that we suddenly have so

many new converts to deterrence, since

many of these same voices were 20

years ago arguing instead for a nuclear

freeze and unilateral U.S. disarmament.

I’ll remember their newfound

commitment to deterrence as we attempt

to deal with China’s growing

militarization in the coming months

and years.

There are situations where deterrence

can work. This is not one of them

for two reasons. First deterrence has a

shelf life. If there is no response to violations,

a dictator is not deterred—the

threat of retaliation is no longer credible.

The U.N. has done nothing and the

U.S. next to nothing. As a result, Saddam

has not been deterred. In any

event, containment and deterrence do

not apply well in this case.

President Bush was absolutely correct

when he declared at West Point

that ‘‘deterrence means nothing

against shadowy terrorist networks

with no nation or citizens to defend;’’

and, ‘‘containment is not possible when

unbalanced dictators with weapons of

mass destruction can deliver those

weapons on missiles or secretly provide

them to terrorist allies.’’

While belatedly embracing deterrence,

critics of force reject a doctrine

of preemption. Yes, they say, there

have always been situations where

countries had to act with force to prevent

some attack on them, but that’s

different from an announced doctrine

of preemption.

There are several answers. The first

is: no it is not. Preemption only applies

to certain situations—like Iraq.

Though Iran presents many of the

same circumstances as Iraq, there are

differentiating factors that make preemption

less appropriate vis-a-vis Iran.

There is no ‘‘outstanding warrant’’ as

with Iraq; regime change could come

from within Iran; and, militarily, force

is much less an option—to name three

differences.

Second, it is senseless to require a

‘‘smoking gun’’ in order to act. As Secretary

Rumsfeld has said: ‘‘A gun

doesn’t smoke until it’s been fired and

the goal has to be to stop such an attack

before it starts.’’

Since September 11, this takes on a

whole new meaning. Don’t think smoking

gun—think World Trade Center and

Pentagon.

As we stand here more than one year

after 3,000 innocent civilians perished

at the hands of vicious terrorists, we

need to ask ourselves, do we really

want to wait until another attack, perhaps

one using weapons of mass destruction?

What opponents really mean

is, wait until just before such an attack,

and only act if we’re reasonably

sure the attack is coming. Obviously,

we can’t count on knowing that, and

the potential consequences are too

great to risk it.

So the answer to that question is an

emphatic no. September 11 changed everything,

or at least should have

changed everything, in the way we approach

these matters. September 11

moved us out of the realm of international

relations theory and into the

realm of self-defense. If the President

decides to move against Iraq, it will be

an act of self-defense. And by voting to

authorize the President to take that

action, this body will be authorizing an

act of self-defense. Knowing what we

know, how could we explain inaction if

we were subsequently attacked?

What’s more, it should be obvious

that if Saddam acquires nuclear weapons,

it will give him the ability to

deter us. We are already hearing arguments

against the use of force because

of the potential of Iraq using chemical

or biological weapons against our

forces. Consider having this debate a

few months or years from now after

we’ve ascertained that he definitely

has a nuclear saber to rattle. This will

make a move against Saddam, or any

other American action in the Middle

East, more dangerous, and in all probability,

less likely. It is Saddam’s

dream come true. He will be able to

check our actions. So, again, the time

to act is now.

But, some critics say, we must wait

for international approval. Mr. President,

I submit that the proponents of

‘‘multilateralism,’’ in addition to willfully

ignoring the fecklessness of the

U.N. and certain other countries, neglect

the special leadership role that

our country plays in the world.

It is no accident that it devolved to

us to end German imperialism in World

War I, stop Adolf Hitler in World War

II, and defeat the forces of international

communism in the Cold War.

It is no accident that the oppressed

peoples of the world look at us, rather

than other countries or the U.N., as

their ray of hope. That is why we lead,

and why we must lead.

We are fortunate to have a President

today who appreciates this. While

much of the rest of the world insists on

burying its head in the sand or clinging

to failed approaches, President Bush

understands that now is the time to

confront Saddam. And while others insist

on a false distinction between the

Iraqi threat and the war on terrorism,

President Bush has, as Noemie Emery

has written in The Weekly Standard,

connected the dots. In so doing, writes

Emery, President Bush has, like Harry

Truman when the Soviets encroached

on Greece and Turkey in the 1940s, perceived

‘‘an ominous and enlarging pattern’’

that demanded a response.

Emery continues, ‘‘Several presidents

have had to wage wars, but only two,

Bush and Truman, have had to perceive

them, and then to define them as

wars.’’

This is the essence of leadership. By

perceiving that we can no longer afford

to be attacked before we act, President

Bush’s doctrine of preemption allows

us, where appropriate, to act first

against terrorist organizations and

states.

Our use of force in self-defense

against Iraq will also help liberate the

beleaguered people of Iraq. Aside from

the moral imperative, there are a number

of tangible benefits to the United

States that a more democratic Iraq

will bring.

First, if real democracy can take

hold, it will dispel the notion that the

people of the Middle East are incapable

of democratic governance, just as Taiwan

and the Philippines have destroyed

the ‘‘Asian values’’ myth in recent

years. It’s notable that the scourge of

Islamic terrorism has been nurtured,

not in democratic Muslim countries

such as Turkey, but in repressive dictatorships

like Iraq, Iran, Syria, and

Saudi Arabia. A democratic regime in

Baghdad will set an example and hopefully

spark other badly-needed changes

in governments in the region. And, in

the long run, democracy will prove to

be the antidote to Islamic-based terrorism.

A democratic regime that follows our

removal of Saddam Hussein will also

provide us with a new and reliable ally

in this critical part of the world. The

war on terrorism will almost certainly

entail additional actions, and the intelligence,

political support, over flight

rights and the like from an allied regime

in Iraq could prove critical to

those efforts.

Lastly, a democratic Iraq will bring

that nation’s vast oil production capabilities

back onto the world market.

This will help the world economy by,

among other things, lessening the ability

of the Saudis and others to manipulate

oil prices.

While I support this resolution and

support using force to rid the world of

Saddam Hussein, I do want to offer a

few caveats.

First, our commitment to this effort

must be total. Our goal here must be

nothing short of the destruction of the

current Iraqi regime. There is no other

realistic way to permanently disarm

Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction.

And providing our Armed Forces

with anything less than everything

they need to accomplish that goal is

unacceptable. And that includes the

support of our intelligence community.

Second, after removing the regime,

we must resist the temptation to rush

home. As I just stated, there are enormous

benefits in helping Iraq achieve

democracy. However, it is most unlikely

that Iraq can be stabilized and

democratized without a significant

U.S. presence after the defeat of Saddam.

There can be no questioning the fact

that the U.S. occupation of Germany

and Japan after World War II was critical

to forging those two countries into

the democracies they now are. I am not

saying we need to copy those examples

precisely, but it would be short-sighted

and dangerous for us to leave a shattered

Iraq on its own or in the hands of

the United Nations after the removal

of Saddam.

Third, we must not undertake this

struggle on the cheap. We should make

no mistake: this operation is going to

require a great deal of manpower,

weapons platforms and equipment, possibly

for quite some time. Those forces

need to come from somewhere, and our

forces have already been stretched thin

by the profusion of peacekeeping missions

and the budget cuts of the 1990s.

Meanwhile, we need to maintain and,

I would say, even augment our deterrent

posture elsewhere in the world.

For example, last year’s Quadrennial

Defense Review, mostly drafted before

September 11, called for increasing our

carrier presence in the Western Pacific.

This seems to me to be quite necessary,

given that we normally have only one

carrier—the *Kitty Hawk—*in that region,

but two potential conflict zones,

Korea and Taiwan. Yet, when we began

our operations in Afghanistan last

year, the *Kitty* Hawk was called to duty

in the Arabian Sea, leaving us with no

carrier in the Western Pacific for

months.

We will almost certainly face this

situation again if we go to war against

Iraq, and it is not something that we

should ignore. The upshot, is that this

body needs to come to grips with the

need for a defense budget that supports

the cost of operations like Afghanistan

and Iraq, defense transformation and

an adequate global force posture. At

current spending levels, we are going

to come up short of that goal.

Last, but not least, I believe the administration

needs to be very careful

in its diplomatic efforts to secure a

new U.N. Security Council resolution.

That body includes the terrorist regime

of Syria, Communist China,

which threatens our friends on Taiwan

and sells fiber-optics to Iraq, and Russia,

which has forged close economic

ties with Iraq over the past decade.

Principle, not expedience, must be our

ultimate guide in dealing with these

countries that hold the votes to deny

or authorize U.N.-backed action.

If we need to make concessions to

these regimes that undermine our interests

elsewhere—in Taiwan, for example—

then it is not worth securing

their votes in the Council. Ultimately,

we should be prepared to defend our interests

with or without the U.N.

Which bring me to my conclusion,

Mr. President.

This resolution we are considering

today, and this action the President is

contemplating in Iraq, is not about

carrying out the will of the United Nations

or restoring its effectiveness. It is

not about assuring the world that the

United States is committed to

‘‘multilateralism.’’

Section 3(a)(1) is the heart and soul

of this resolution. It authorizes the

President to use the Armed Forces of

the United States to ‘‘defend the national

security of the United States

against the continuing threat posed by

Iraq.’’

That is what we are doing here today,

defending our national security.

It is a sobering, and humbling, task.

But as members of the United States

Senate, it is our solemn duty.

Madam President, I hope to

have the opportunity to speak to this

issue again, but I will say two quick

things in response to the Senator from

Virginia.

First, I note that Hans Blix has

largely, it appears to me from news

media accounts, agreed with the position

of the United States on what

would be necessary to conduct meaningful

inspections that would result in

the disarmament of Saddam Hussein

because, as he noted, the object here is

not inspections; the object is disarmament.

And inspections would be but

a way to achieve that.

Secondly, as I said, I think that only

the most naive would believe that it is

possible to have an effective regime, irrespective

of what kind of resolution

were adopted, as long as Saddam Hussein

is in power. That is why I quoted

the former U.N. inspection team leader

David Kay, who made the point, with

which I totally agree, that as long as

Saddam Hussein is in power there, it is

impossible to have disarmament of the

kind that was called for at the end of

the gulf war.